“The situation is under control” –  this phrase was used by the Ukrainian government/army:

in September when the attack began and Russian forces took all hangar buildings,

in October, when they seized Terminal 2 for several times,

in November, when Russian shelling and destruction mounted,

in December, when Terminal 2 were handed over to the invasion army peacefully and Russians took up perfect offensive positions beside Terminal 1,

on January 5 when Ukrainian intelligence services announced fresh  Russian army formations arrived to surround and take the airport as the top priority,

on January 12, when new Russian ground forces showed up in Terminal 2, announcing to do exactly that,

on January 13, when the badly damaged tower collapsed under intense artillery and tank fire in the morning and Ukrainian troops stopped a first Chechen infantry push in the basement of the last Ukrainian-held terminal in the evening

AND on January 15 – today – when Russian invasion forces finally stormed the terminal and are fighting Ukrainian troops inside it since 7 hours now.

The situation is NOT under control. It is out of control since the Minsk agreement, which has NEVER been a mutual ceasefire as agreed on, but always an unilateral truce, only adhered to by the Ukrainian side. Nobody should be surprised now. Russian invasion forces didn’t attack Terminal 1 by surprise, they advance since 5 months. Every month. Steadily and without major setbacks. This development was observed and well-documented by dozens of analysts and – of course – also by the Ukrainian army, which lost its freedom of movement / building after building / man after man in the area of the airport since September last year. However for a reason that can only be called deliberate blind appeasement policy, the Ukrainian leadership decided to let Russian forces advance over a period of about 130 days, pretending “the situation is under control”, which now should be clear to everyone, it is not.

At the same time, president Poroshenko connected the defense of the airport inseparable with the defense of entire Ukraine, saying December 5 that the defense of Donetsk airport actually is the defense of Kiev and Lviv. Losing the airport means losing Ukraine. Knowing this, it is even less understandable why he accepted the Russian advance for the last 5 months, without implementing any forceful countermeasure.

So his afternoon, the inevitable happened. Under intense tank fire from Spartak and Vesele plus artillery and mortar support from all across Donetsk city and Makeevka, Russian infantry forces stormed the ground floor of Terminal 1, coming from nearby Terminal 2. Remember that this 50 meters away building was transferred from Ukrainian to Russian troops peacafully in early December as it was allegedly “destroyed and not usable as a strategic position” anymore. Another misjudgment, obviously.

Russian troops, walking from the old into the new terminal without resistance.

While the actual attack was not caught on camera, Russian TV published first images shortly after, showing its forces controlled practically the entire second floor of Terminal 1, offering views into all four cardinal directions. Parts of the apron, the car park, the destroyed tower and Terminal 2 are clearly visible in the footage as can be seen below. At the same time, Ukrainian forces in or near the airport reported they also fought invasion units of “battalion size” (so more than 300 soldiers) that entered the basement and the 3rd floor. Indeed Russian TV footage showed them changing levels inside the terminal, looking all across the large entrance hall of the terminal and firing up and down stairs within the building. Last but not least to enter the 2nd floor as the Ukrainian government confirmed, they must have passed the ground floor and 1st floor at some point. So in conclusion it is fair to say, battles between Ukrainian forces and Russian invaders took place all across Terminal 1 at the afternoon of January 15.

Views to all sides

But Russian troops were not just inside the Terminal. The nearest possible Ukrainian defense position is located at the ruins of the tower buildings, some 870 meters to the west. Russian tanks and ground troops moved all along south of Terminal 1, passing it and coming in a position to fire at the remains of the tower from that range. This way, they could cut Ukrainian reinforcements from Pisky and the tower – at least for a while.

Russian T-64, firing at the tower ruins.

At 21:00 that day, one of the defenders announced via Facebook that over the afternoon and evening they were able to “take up positions in all floors” again with the help of arriving reinforcements. Moreover artillery ran off the attacking tanks and they could evacuate their dead and wounded (at least 2 KIA, 7 WIA). However the message included the famous phrase that should cause everybody to be terrified of the next days: “The situation is under control.”*

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* respectively: “The situation is more or less stabilized.”

In the early afternoon hours of January 13, one of the most deadly single incidents during the Russian aggression in southern and eastern Ukraine hit a bus near a police / border guards checkpoint at the northern outskirts of the Ukrainian city of Volnovakha.

Shortly after the tragedy, a (graphic!) video appeared on YouTube, being widely assumed as the main evidence to find out, what happened to the bus and – the main question – who caused that massacre on innocent civilians. However, different versions of sense making appeared, seemingly contradicting each other. One of a Russian-fired missile or artillery round, hitting the area around the checkpoint and causing the carnage, published by pro-Ukrainian analysts; one of an Ukrainian mine, hitting the bus, leading to the senseless deaths; published by pro-Russian activists. Since then the two factions are confronting each other with their evidence, blaming the other side of lying. This short article argues that both are partly right and there is common ground between them, explaining the massacre.

Within a couple of hours, interpretermag published a report, convincingly illustrating that a rocket or artillery round, fired from the Russian-held Dokuchajevsk area to the north east, hit just right of the bus, causing the disaster (image below). Both the impact crater and the damage on the ground support this argument, which can not be refuted.

Source: The Interpreter, analysis by Dajey Petros

Shortly after, a pro-Russian side published a report based on the same video, pointing out that the bus was very close to an Ukrainian mine field, an Ukrainian soldier could be seen, carrying and anti-personal mine just outside the bus and typical fragments of an Ukrainian-used MON-50 mine could be seen between the blood of the victims inside the hit vehicle (images below). The three aspects, despite not supporting the official Ukrainian version of the events, must be taken into account, trying to understand what caused the bloodbath.

Source: http://zergulio.livejournal.com

Source: http://zergulio.livejournal.com

Making sense of it all: From a fact-based analytical perspective, all surrounding circumstances must be considered, no matter of the political alignment. In this regard, both version are supported by facts and no obvious manipulation can be seen from my understanding. Hence the question arises, if both version are true and a combination of different fatal weapons – used by Russian invaders and placed by Ukrainian defenders – led to the deaths of 13 innocent people with several more still fighting for their lives in hospitals.

From all available data (video footage only, not statements by either side), it appears that the Russian-fired impacting shell hit the mine field to the right side of the bus, triggering a chain reaction by causing one or more of the there-put MON-50 to explode. Not in the intended direction – away from the street – but due to the impact power right towards the passing by bus, causing a catastrophe. Thus, BOTH, fragments of the Grad missile / artillery round AND of the thrown-up mines hit the bus in a totally uncontrolled manner, causing the visible damage, which could be seen in the aftermath footage. The subsequent analytical display portrays what could have happened within seconds yesterday afternoon, leading to imminent mass casualties. This conclusion seems most convincing as it includes all available evidence from the scene.

Source: own creation, based on Bing Maps

So who is to blame? The answer is obvious: The Russian side. They fired towards the checkpoint, knowingly that civilian vehicles would be queueing there, waiting to be checked before leaving / entering Volnovakha. By firing at the Ukrainian government checkpoint, they approved civilian casualties, once again showing their total disrespect for innocent human life and the “rules of war”.

At the same time, it must be concluded that the Ukrainian side unnecessarily tried to cover up that not only an incoming projectile, but mainly the accidentally triggered MON-50 mines (caused by the intentionally fired shell of course!) hit the chassis of the passing bus, causing 13 deaths. Ukrainian troops removed some of the mines – also simply to be safe during the rescue and recovery operation – and the Ukrainian government version doesn’t mention any mines involved in the tragedy. This behavior is – as I said – absolutely unnecessary and contraproductive as it produces doubt about the version where all moral arguments about the blame are on the Ukrainian side.

In conclusion, what we saw yesterday was another unprovoked act of violence vs. civilians by Russian terrorist and army forces, willing to advance at any cost. The Volnovakha bus massacre was caused by its deliberate actions vs. Ukrainian-held territory, leading to a deadly chain of reactions which killed 12 more Ukrainians in the Russian-led war.

Update #1

As many experts argue, I am wrong with my analysis, I took another look at the only known Grad impact location in the field and the location and external damage at the bus at this time. The missile impacted at least 10 meters from the bus, hitting deep into the snow with most of its energy. I see no chance, it caused the visible damage at the bus and plus 12 deaths inside it. There must have been secondary blasts, caused by triggered / hurled up mines, to cause such damage and casualty picture.

bus-impact distance

PS: In the end, I can not say, which kind of mines were placed in the field, MON-50 or – maybe more convincing – other sorts of contact mines. However what I can say is that the official version (one Grad missile hit) does not add up.

Update #2

Meanwhile, more footage appeared and I did some more analyzing of the already known material.

At first, I took another look at the impact site yesterday. If the Grad missile really hit the area from an N-NE angle – and nobody doubts that – its main force should have gone to the S-SW. The impact area confirms this and shows that  most of the snow was burned in that direction, indicating that also most of the impact and explosive energy of the missile must have been directed towards this angle (picture below).

impact direction towards S-SW

At the same time, the bus is located 7-10 meters to the N-E of the impact crater and only little snow is burned in that direction before and after the little mound on the side of the street. So IF the buse was hit by the main force of the missile, which would have been necessary to cause such carnage, it should have been some more meters down the road to directly “drive into” the main blast direction. A look at its front shows that this is not the case.

undamaged bus front

Thus, it must be assumed that the bus stood exactly where it was filmed when it was hit, so to the right of the main blast energy of the impacting Grad. A last look at the bus illustrates that the damage is not the same all over, but different zones show a different degree of external damage (image below). The “what cause what” mark is just an estimate of course. The main point is that such damage is very unusual for being caused by a Grad that hit a snowy field, 7-10 meters in a 90° angle to its impact. It is almost unthinkable that 20+ people got killed and injured by the Grad blast. The tree shows also blast damage, which could well be from the exploding missile. However this tree is only 1-2 meters away from the impact site, while the buse is located further away. In conclusion: It remains hard to believe the missile alone caused 12 deaths inside the bus, despite exploding too far away and not being “directed” towards the affected bus.

bus damage

Last but not least, a video appeared, showing the Grad attack on the checkpoint that caused the deaths. Althoug the camera is directed towards the north and only captures the shadow of he bus blast, it contains an interesting detail. The missiles that hit nearest to the base – also close to the street and near the trees – possibly caused the same as what I am pointing to on the other side of the base, namely a secondary blast by a mine, located close to where the missile hit. While all other missiles – also impacting in the middle of the street – caused dark shallow smoke, this one caused a bright flash up in the trees accompanied by upgoing white smoke in addition to the black one. Althoug the images are blurry and no final conlusions can be drawn, this could be the precedent that makes my interpretation of the events yet a bit more likely.

Many analysts an – much worse – seemingly also the Ukrainian government were surprised by the recent surge in violence in eastern Ukraine while most western media branches have not even noticed that Russia took its war against Ukraine to a new level with an unprecedented “increase in number and intensity of attacks” (the Ukr army).

Several number confirm that observation. While the first shaky weeks of the Minsk “ceasefire” in September saw between 30 and 40 attacks per day, that number reduced to around 10 (/day) in November and December last year. First analysts thought president Poroshenko’s appeasement policy towards Russia bore fruit, but during the first week of January, the Ukrainian army recorded once again around 40 attacks per day. This number increased more and more, reaching 50 and stands at more than 60 per day right now.

Another indication of the recent surge in anti-Ukrainian military violence is the number of Ukrainian army casualties. On December 9 2014, Petro Poroshenko proudly announced that the last 24 hours had seen not a single Ukrainian army casualty, seemingly supporting his “We stop shooting, they will follow” policy. But things turned out to be developing in the utter opposite direction. A new Russian offensive, starting on New Year’s day 14/15 brought more than a hundred Ukrainian military casualties, with the 48 hours from January 8 to 10 resulting in 34 dead in injured only to have just one example.

During the last days, the number of attacks became simply too high to count and the incidents are impossible to distinguish from each other, though, I tried as this “one-evening-MLRS-target-map” from the northern Luhansk front shows.

Russian MLRS and artillery attacks on the eve of January 11

Instead the entire Ukrainian front in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions is under intense attack of all kinds of weapons, mainly heavy ones like tank, heavy artillery, Grad missiles and even BM-27 Uragan, which are might MLRS with a highly destructive potential. In one word, what we see since the last 2 weeks is not just an “extreme deterioration of the situation”, but war, simple as that.

But was this development really so unforeseeable?

At least two facts, one clearly visible, one invisible until very recently, show that this is nothing of the sort of a “sudden rise in violence” or an “unexpected flare in attacks” like many experts want to make us believe. Instead, I argue, this whole process goes exactly according to a precisely scheduled plan by the warmongers in the Kremlin, which are not at their target situation in Ukraine yet.

1. The obvious prologue

Everybody could see the influx of tens of thousands of Russian “volunteers” (paid mercenaries) and army personal. This did not happen during the last 2 or 4 weeks or under any serious cover, but at since late October and in brought daylight.

In late October, the first some hundred “little green men” showed up in Donetsk city, widely reflected by the online community and the Russian mainstream media.

At November 1 for example, hundreds of – obvious – Russian troops with modern equipment showed up in Luhansk, parading through the city and openly declaring it under their control from then on (picture). These troops were strenghtened and spread throughout other cities, for example Krasnyi Luch where they showed up on December 12 with an even larger military parade.

Shortly after on November 10, more heavy Russian army armor – T-72B1 – showed up on the streets of Donetsk, at a time, the Minsk agreement demanded “pro-Russian forces” to withdraw exactly these weapons from the buffer zone.

There are many more examples, also from as early as September when a 100+ Russian army KamAZ and heavy artillery convoy reached Donetsk city over several days. One more example is to be called as it seemed so unreal at this point that most analysts just went over it. In late November, an entire (Russian) army under the flag of “Novorossiya” and marked with Soviet CCCP signs waited at Ukraine’s eastern border – inside Russia!! – ready to invade. It obviously did shortly after.

In conclusion, no one could say in early December that Russia had not literally shouted, “We prepare for war inside Ukraine!” while some optimists – like me – still had another theory, seeing the invasion of thousands of Russian troops bright-eyed. But this hope – that Russia sent regular soldiers to calm down the situation and stop “rogue” militias from attacking Ukrainian soil  – was dead wrong. It sent them to control each and every anti-Ukrainian fighter, match them to one force under one command and be more fit for the decisive battle which would start 2 months later.

2. The invisible prologue

Analyzing the military hardware inside the Russian invasion base in Russia’s Rostov region, there was one thing that puzzled me for several days. Between the different battle groups were a number of white spots, which I found hard to identify for quite some time (picture below, exact position on a map).

First, I thought those were tents as they have the same color as them of them inside the base, but a second look confirmed, those are army vehicles. After several discussions with other analysts, we still had no real clue. Neither the idea that those were the “aid convoy” trucks nor “MC – Russian peacekeeping” vehicles was quite convincing. The aid trucks enter Ukraine officially and don’t have to “hide” at such – formerly semi-secret – base and Russia – after some public mulling – decided to not play the MC (“peacekeeping”) card in Ukraine. Then finally, the bitter truth filtered through.

After @DajeyPetros spot and my analysis of the Russian invasion base, I read an article by the AAAS, confirming the base was established around March 2014 – a date, I could not confirm as I just knew, it was developed after October 2013. At this time – 5 months before the Russian army invasion in Eastern Ukraine in late August – thousands of troops and hundreds of weapon systems were prepared to be deployed inside the neighboring country – all according to a much larger plan and while the world looked at Crimea.

So for what could these white vehicles – 90% sure BMP and BTR  – be positioned there in October (the date of the satellite image) or even earlier?! … WINTER WAR!

And guess, what showed up shortly after – far too earlier, because long before prepared and not prepared for a late-starting winter – in Luhansk and Donetsk regions?! Correct. White-colored BTR and BMP. Moscow planned its escalating – or at least at no point cutting back – winter offensive inside Ukraine far in advance, probably just after the August offensive, in any case well before October 2014

left: BMP-2 in Donetsk, right: BTR-80 in Luhansk

What does all this tell us? What we see is sufficient evidence that Russia never had the plan to halt aggressive operations in eastern Ukraine – especially not this winter, which will probably hold for the next 2 months in Donbas. Its offensive capacities in manpower and equipment were very openly built up during the last 3 months all across the occupied territory and the base satellite images reveal that it planned what it did in March for August and in October for January – now. What we see in eastern Ukraine is nothing like “sudden” or “unexpected” developments, but an escalation of warfare and offensive operations within the plot of a master plan. It is going all according to Kremlin’s plan, developed long ago and – at least 50% – announced to Ukraine and the world since October 2014 at latest. Saying, we are “surprised” now shows either very limited foresight or dishonestly to itself and its people.

On January 6, @DajeyPetros spotted that the latest updated Google Earth satellite images revealed / included the base, many people knew about, but nobody could ever locate due to Russian army security measure to not leak meaningful footage of it and the lack of recent satellite footage from the area.

The Russian invasion, that started in April 2014 and continues to that very day includes hundreds of tanks, apcs, MLRS and other vehicles as well as thousands of shells, missiles and last but not least tens of thousands of Russian army personal as well as Russian army-trained “volunteers” or rather paid mercenaries / invasion troops. Such invasion can not be planned and organized from Moscow alone or via regular army bases, which are either too far away from the Ukrainian border or by far not large enough to handle the logistics necessary for such an operation. It needs (at least) one major logistical military hub. This hub was revealed by the latest Google Earth satellite image update.

The following article answers 5 questions, you should know about when talking about that base in particular and the sophistication and organized malice of the Russian policy towards Ukraine in general.

1. Where is the base?

The base is located in a strategically brilliant position. 23 km north east of Taganrog and 30 km north west of Rostov-on-Don, it is in close range of several major Russian army hubs, including military bases, airports but also civilian supply structures for the daily life of the thousands of troops inside the base.

Strategic position in Russia

However, the major significance of the localization of the base appears, when we look at it in relation to the deployment zone in Ukraine. From the very south to the very north of the today mostly-occupied areas in Donbas, namely the centers of Mariupol, Donetsk and Luhansk, the distance is almost exactly 130 km, meaning an offensive- as well as quick reaction potential at all sectors of the front within the same period of time. At the same time, the base if 48km from the nearest Ukrainian border point, giving it a “safety distance” to possible counter attacks.

Strategic position in relation to Ukraine — map source: Ukr. ATO

2. How large is the base?

It is HUGE … The north-south expansion of the base is exactly 6.5 kilometers, so 4 miles. There are several concentrations of buildings, tents and vehicles all along that axis. The east-west expansion depends on what you regard as being a “military base”. In a width of 600 meters, we have the hard infrastructure of the base, again including buildings and vehicles plus positioned artillery pieces and much more (for more, read 4.). In a width of 2 kilometers, we can see extensive tracks, probably from intense training exercises and scattered current and former structures, which were used as forward positions and observation points. In its total width of 6.5 km, there are multiple craters visible, likely from artillery and tank shelling.

So in conclusion, we have a built up infrastructure area of 4 km², a vehicle training ground of 10 km² and a firing range of another 30 km². Adding all this to a coherent military installation, we find an area of some 40 km² which as an example is 4 times bigger than the airport of London Heathrow.

Dimensions of the base

3. When was the base established?

The area in question was last scanned by available satellites in October 2013, so 4 months before the Russian invasion of Crimea started and half a year, before Donbas was for the first time attacked and occupied by Russian forces. At images from that time, nothing is to see that would indicate the soon emergence of a large military complex or only a new road or farm on the concerned field. One year later, a complex military installation exists at this large field. So given the fact, it would need at least 1-2 months to build the entire infrastructure (including fixed buildings), the date of the base formation could be in August 2014.

Comparison Left: October 2013; Right: October 2014

But there are hints, indicating an even earlier start of construction and use. Between the developed parts of the base, large areas with former formations can be seen. What happened to the units in these areas? They were either given up, moved to another – the current – October 2014 location OR – which is the most likely version – were completely deployed as invasion army battle groups to Ukraine. Three examples are given below. Again: Remember that all these major installations were built up and removed between October 2013 and October 2014.

former battle group positions inside the base

Taking into account that it took also 1-2 months to build these developments and another few weeks to remove them once again, it must be concluded that the base was built up and used at least since June 2014, possibly even earlier. This would mean that all escalation, especially the one from late August, costing over 1000 Ukrainian troops their lives, was planned long before, showing that Russia had plans for a major escalation even before the Ukrainian army moved into the mostly unarmed separatist-held cities in early summer last year. It also shows that after annexing Crimea, Russia never planned to rethink its policies and lied all along, claiming it was finished with its expansionism inside Ukraine.

4. Which military hardware is inside the base?

In brief: All it needs to lead a war and all, we saw and see entering Ukraine from Russia.

There are several concentrations of Russian army vehicles of the same type all across the outlined base parameters. However, we are talking about commercially detailed satellite images, so there is it is possible for experts to identify the general model of a weapon system, but not to distinguish between different versions of it (like BTR-70 or BTR-80). Nonetheless, I have identified groups of KamAZ and Ural trucks, BMP-1/ BMP-2, BTR-70/BTR-80, MT-LB, MT-LBu, Msta-S and Msta-B, BM-21/27/30 and last but not least T-64/T-72. The following image is only one example of one battle group, being stationed at the base.

Weapon systems

The next image seems extremely interesting as it shows several multy launch rocket systems, but also something, which looks like sophisticated air defense systems, possibly the SA-10 “Grumble”. However, this can not be said for sure as we are talking about satellite images with a maximum resolution of maybe 1 meter large objects.

MLRS plus AA systems?!

Summarizing the vehicles and weapons systems at the front it can – once again – be excluded – that this is any kind of regular or defensive military installation. It houses – as I said before – battle groups, ready to be deployed as punchy forces in a neighboring country, leading to the last question.

5. What is the main purpose of the base?

While such question could (or even should) not be answered out of the blue, the first four points of this analytic article qualified it for an informed answer. Looking at the position, size, age and equipment of the base, only one conclusion is possible: This is the one base to rule them all. It was established and still is operated for one reason: To keep the invasion and ongoing occupation of neighboring Ukraine running.

Its current and former visiting forces suggest the assumption that it is BOTH a RF armed forces-led training ground for “voluntary”–> paid Russian invasion forces and the small number of real Ukrainian separatists where they can learn / refresh their driving and firing skills before going to war AND a “traditional” Russian army base, serving as a bridgehead for all major offensive operations and a backup- and retreat area for resupplies and reinforcements. Just today, the Ukrainian defense minister said that 7.500 Russian army troops are serving in Ukraine at the moment, being constantly rotated with their entire equipment. Now we know to / from where and that fresh battle groups are always waiting to be deployed.

All in all, the – at some point inevitable – revelation of this large key base is another reminder that Russia is not hiding its efforts in its war on Ukraine anymore and probably never did. It is also a reminder that the mainstream media and most Western – and Ukrainian! – politicians are painting an entirely wrong picture of the situation. We are not facing a “covert war”, nor have there ever been “Russian-backed rebels” in Ukraine. What we see since almost 11 months is an aggressive war by the Russian Federation vs. the sovereign state of Ukraine, with all organisation and logistics such war necessarily needs.

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