A glimmer of hope – the Azov counteroffensive

Posted on February 10, 2015 by Julian Röpcke

Surprise attack

This morning, the Ukrainian national guard force “Regiment Azov” surprised virtually the whole world when it claimed, it started a counteroffensive east and north east of Mariupol mostly along the coastline of the Azov sea. Within hours, it pierced the thin Russian line of defense some 2-5 km east of the city and retook important towns like Pavlopil, Shyronkyne and Kominternove. At the same time it took the smaller settlements of Lebedynske and Berdyanske, which over the last month were more than once the launching pads for Russian tank, mortar and artillery attacks on the Ukrainian front east of Mariupol.

The liberated areas

First evidence pictures came from Pavlopil, which fell to Russian forces in early December last year, breaking the Minsk agreement. Geolocable footage shows, Regiment Azov indeed regained control over the town on the eastern bank of the river Kalmius, which was often used to attack nearby Orlivske and Hnutove since then. The picture shows that the “Novorossiya” flag was replaced by an Ukrainian one early on February 10.

Liberated Pavlopil

But Regiment Azov did not limit its push to the northern countryside of Mariupol. Instead, it also attacked right eastward, not halting at the pragmatically agreed on “Minsk demarcation line”, but – rightly – crossing it to recapture what Russia had stolen from Ukraine in late September last year, when it invaded Novoazovsk and the surrounding areas from the direction of Taganrog. Simultaniously to Pavlopil in the north, Ukrainian forces captured Shyrokyne, the coastal town which was captured by Russian army forces on October 17 last year and for instance the origin of a deadly Grad attack (geolocated by me) on Talakivka 10 days later. The Ukrainian push reached further inland, with Regiment Azov reporting, they had attacked the first checkpoints of the Russian stronghold Sakhanka. However, this town could not be taken immediately, but fighting rages on. The local Russian invasion command in Donetsk confirmed the offensive shortly after, however denying that Ukrainian forces had indeed overrun Shyrokyne and claiming that fightin was still ongoing in the area.

Update: Shortly after the article was published, Regiment Azov published footage from its push into Shyrokyne. Geolocated (by me), it proves, the entire town was taken over and Russian forces remain to the north east of it (see geolocation below).

Shyrokyne under control of Regiment Azov

Further north, Ukrainian troops sped down the T0519 road, reaching the next Russian-held town around 11am, named Kominternove. Ukrainian forces liberated Kominternove, however Russian occupiers meanwhile adjusted to the “Blitzkrieg”-like surpirse offensive and firing at the town from Zaichenko to its east, injuring several people. The frontline remains between the tow towns, according to the latest information around 4pm local time in the afternoon.

In conclusion, Ukrainian national guard forces shifted the frontline up to 11 km to the east, taking an area of more than 100km² as the below (report and evidence footage-based) map illustrates.

Ukrainian advances east of Mariupol, February 10, 2015

The strategic goal

While during the first 3 hours it looked like Regiment Azov had left the Ukrainian chain of command and attacked eastward without Kiev’s backing, the National Security and Defense Council then reported, its secretary, Turchinov personally commanded the offensive and was in Mariupol. At the same time, the strategic purpose of the latest offensive remains. While Regiment Azov says, it was to “push the enemy frontline from the city [Mariupol] and decrease the threat of MLRS fire”, the Ukrainian army command says, it was to “return to the demarcation line military demarcation, which were recorded in the Minsk agreements”. Whatever it really is, the offensive shows that a surprise push against (locally) weak Russian lines can lead to substantial territorial gains.

The bigger picture

However it remains unclear of the move was wise. With Russian invasion forces unable to take Mariupol for now, they shifted their focus further to the north of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Now that Ukrainian forces left the cover of the town and went into open country, they are more vulnerable to enemy attacks than before. It also remains unclear, if the Russian invasion command in Mosow will accept today’s defeat in the area or rather mobilize once again its mighty military just over the border in Taganrog to launch an even harder counteroffensive. At the same time, the heinous Russian army 9A52-4 Tornado attack on Kramatorsk – 50 km from the actual frontline, killing 7 civilians and 4 soldiers – might be a first retaliation measure by the aggressor, showing he is not happy with the Ukrainian move in the south. Whatever will happen next, the Ukrainian army (/National Guard) set an important sign of exclamation with the Azov counteroffensive. After losing hundreds of soldier for just holding or losing (1500 km²) ground over the last 6 months, it now seeds a tiny glimmer of hope to millions of Ukrainians and around the globe, having almost lost hope that the status quo in occupied Donbas would ever again shift to Ukraine’s favor whether politically or militarily founded.

At the same time, this local success doesn’t change the overall picture of the military situation in Donbas. Between 1500 and 5000 Ukrainian troops remain trapped in the pocket of Debaltseve with all Ukrainian army efforts to reopen it failing so far. The Russian army is several times stronger and better equipped than Ukrainian defenders and the momentum of the battle for Ukraine will not shift due to the coastal offensive in the south. But the signal is important. Ukraine will not go down without a fight and there is some hope left, the international community will come to its senses, support Ukraine in its struggle for freedom and punish Russia for its behavior with severe political and economic sanctions.

The worst case – The pocket of Debaltseve closes, trapping thousands of Ukrainian troops

Posted on February 9, 2015 by Julian Röpcke

This morning, February 9 2015 at 9:25, Russian forces in eastern Ukraine claimed what was looming and inevitable seeing no change in tactics and steadily rising Russian ground forces since the beginning of January, but latest since the fall of Vuhlehirsk on February 4 – the pocket of Debaltseve closed and thousands of Ukrainian soldiers got trapped between the Russian puppet regime republics of Donetsk and Luhansk.

What was the initial situation?

During the last two weeks, Russian forces made steady territorial gains around Debaltseve, capturing for example Nikishyne, Ridkodub, Mius and the 8000 inhabitants town of Vuhlehirsk as well as overrunning the Ukrainian front in Chornukhyne only 6 km from Debaltseve itself. However, the Ukrainian central military command kept lying to itself, its soldiers and its citizens, claiming on its daily updated maps that nothing really changed and losses were not strategically important, demanding no change in policy (total offensive or withdrawal of up to 5000 troops, facing the danger of getting encircled). The below map shows the situation as described by the Ukrainian military command (left) and Russian invasion media (right). Despite the certain fact that the Russian map includes an element of exaggeration, it is much closer to reality, showing the almost-encirclement of all Ukrainian forces in Debaltseve and south of it. Meanwhile the Ukrainian map did not even “dare” to remove the Ukrainian flag from Vuhlehirsk, simply not talking about it anymore since the loss 6-7 days ago.

Comparison of Ukrainian and Russian map of the situation around Debaltseve for February 8

Then yesterday evening it was reported that Russian forces had pushed northward from Vuhlehirsk, taking Kaliynivka. I assessed the development in my latest article, predicting that if there was no immediate counteroffensive, Kalynivka would be the springboard to the E40 – the only lifeline to Debaltseve – just 3.5 kilometers away from it. It turned out, exactly this should happen within the next 24 hours. The map below shows the situation as it looked according to my analysis yesterday.

The situation on the eve of the Russian push to close the pocket

What happened today?

Early morning today, strong Russian army forces departed from their strongholds in Horlivka and Yenakijeve (or came directly from the direction of the Russian-Ukrainian border), made a last stop in Vuhlehirsk and drove northward, passing yesterday-taken (and unchallenged) Kalynivka and head-on attacked the tiny village of Lohvynove which is the only settlement along the E40 between Luhanske and Debaltseve and possibly one of the weakest points of defense among the Ukrainian defense positions. It is possible that Russian forces also attacked from Nyzhnje Lozove to the north, but rather unlikely. There is an Ukrainian defense position (different from the south) and no footage available of fighting at that location, before reaching Lohvynove. Also,(unconfirmed) footage shows strong Russian army formations, passing rather urban areas “to the checkpoint” and thus probably coming from the nearby towns to the south and south west.

2S1 self-propelled artillery pieces “on their way to the checkpoint”

Long before first pictures of the actual attack on Lohvynove were published by Russian state media and pro-Russian media groups in occupied Donbas in the late afternoon hours of February 9, I posted the first tactical map of how the situation might have developed according to reports in the morning hours and around noon, made by two Ukrainian journalists and two army sources on the ground.

Territorial possession and Russian assault direction

It should be mentioned again that while the Russian side claimed the closure of the pocket since noon, Ukrainian army sources vehemently denied such development, also calling on journalists to not publish reports, based on Russian invasion sources. This – extremely weak – tactic was already used, when Ilovaisk, Donetsk airport or Vuhlehirsk were lost to Russian forces and the Ukrainian army tried to gain the information monopoly of the situation, publishing the related new when it would have wanted to …

Then in the evening of February 9, the same disgusting procedure as always started with Russian state media airing (graphic!) footage of overrun Ukrainian positions, bloody Ukrainian POW and yelling Russian ground forces. What is important about the footage however is that it – geolocated – proves that Russian forces indeed too Lohvynove and were – at least for some hours – in full control of it. Especially footage of the bus station along the E40 proved that they cut the “lifeline” of several thousand Ukrainian troops east and south east of it.

More (graphic!) footage from another pro-Russian channel showed that the (filmed) forces indeed approached the village from the south, further continuing to the inhabited part of it on the north-eastern side of the E40. It also shows that the Ukrainian army claim of a “tank and apc” force is rather not accurate as dozens of marching ground troops can be seen in the footage, while only one Russian MT-LB is seen nearby.

Over the whole afternoon and evening, the Ukrainian army claimed that it was “in full control of the entire E40/M04 between Artemivsk and Debaltseve”. This seems increasingly unlikely, especially as Ukrainian media in the evening hours quoted soldiers on the ground, reporting the pocket was closed and not only that; Russian forces had also entered Myronivka some 13 km north of the described battlefield, threatening a double layer around the Ukrainian troops in the bridgehead around Debaltseve and holding back possible reinforcements at the same time. Myronivka is located at the entrance of the Ukrainian promontory into Russian-held territory. A real cut of the E40 there would even trap 1-2 thousand Ukrainian troops more as it would also cut Svitlodars’k and Luhanske from the Ukrainian mainland. The below map, based on the pro-Russian version, shows where the two (reported) E40 cut-off locations are located and illustrates the looming disaster.

The looming “double-layered” siege

Latest reports from an Ukrainian investigative journalist in the area confirmed fighting around Lohvynove into the late evening with Russian forces holding the village (blocking the E40) and Ukrainian army units trying to recapture it. The report also included another battle in the village Novohryhorivka, which was fiercely attacked over the whole day and on the verge of falling to Russian troops in the evening. If one or both villages remains under Russian control over the next hours, the journalist rightly concludes, the pocket would be closed.

What happens next?

With the next Minsk talks (a pure farce against the backdrop of the Kremlin obvious and deadly aspirations to capture wide parts of Ukraine with 10.000s of troops and all brutality and willingness to sacrifice thousands of Russian citizens for that aim) coming on Wednesday, the Russian aim is to raise the stakes. Whether or not thousands of encircled Ukrainian troops will be part of the bargain at these negotiations, the Russian aim is to get full control over Debaltseve, being able to move on westward with thousands of own troops, now bound in and around the city.

Looking at hasty ongoing Ukrainian efforts at this very moment, it seems not impossible that it will be able to breach the de facto pocket, which holds since 15 hours, in the coming hours. However if it does so, using all its reserves in the area, it will only be a question of hours or days, before even stronger Russian army reinforcements will push back the Ukrainian army forces and re-close the pocket. Observed Russian army Msta-S columns, a few kilometers to the north in Alchevsk, show what Putin is ready to invest to reach that goal. The battle around Debaltseve is decided, the pocket is closed right now, between 2000 and 5000 troops are besieged and the outlook is gloomy.

Without an immediate and full mobilization, martial law, outside military assistance and intense international diplomatic and economic sanctions to bring Russia back to its senses, Debaltseve will fall within days and the entire Ukrainian frontline will collapse in a couple of weeks or months at max. Russia’s and its proxies’ aim is clear and openly admitted: The seizure of the entire Donbas. Once it has achieved that goal, no more military or moral boundaries will be existent to capture the rest of what it regards as “Novorossiya” reaching up to the borders of the European Union.

Silent advances – Russian troops are closing in on Debaltseve

Posted on February 8, 2015 by Julian Röpcke

During the last days, the international media sight concerning the war in Ukraine was widely focused on the political arena, reporting on the Merkel / Hollande “peace plan” visits in Kiev and Moscow and the clash of arguments by Ukrainian president Poroshenko and Russian foreign minister Lavrov at the Munich security conference. At the same time, the real battlefield around the Ukrainian-held key city of Debaltseve fell from view in what seems to be another orchestrated distraction by the invasion command in Moscow. However throwing the spotlight back on the battlefield reveals worrying developments on the ground, indicating an approaching catastrophe for thousands of Ukrainian soldiers in and around Debaltseve. After the fall of Vuhehirsk and Nikishyne to Russian army forces, new key defense points and villages become the focus of the invasion army, trying to advance on Ukrainian-held Debaltseve. After having lost substantial amounts of tanks and apc in open country assaults between Vuhlehirsk respectively Sanzharivka and their target areas in and around Debaltseve, the Russian army once again switches to smaller assaults through inhabited or wooden areas, supported by heavy artillery and MLRS fire and with a much larger success. The below map shows the focus assault directions over the last 48 hours, which will be analysed in the following paragraphs.

tactical map and assault focuses around Debaltseve

Vuhlehirsk and Kalynivka

After capturing Vuhlehirsk and eliminating last Ukrainian defense positions inside the city around February 3, Russian forces had to once again focus southwards, where the town’s mine was the last remaining Ukrainian stronghold in the area, from which troops were sent in late January to recapture the southern entrance of Vuhehirsk and some apartment blocks in its south east. On February 7, pro-Russian media published footage of finally taking the mine facility, neutralizing the last threat to its control over Vuhlehirsk from another direction than Debaltseve itself.

Having secured the hinterland, Russian army forces reportedly advanced north, taking Kalynivka yesterday or today with 6 armored fighting vehicles and 2 tanks said to have taken control over the strategic village, only 3.5 kilometers from the E40 – the last remaining road leading out of Debaltseve. If they can hold the position, there is virtually no way for Ukrainian reinforcements to enter or leave the area without being subject to direct fire from the view point.

Mius and Ridkodub

Moving further to the east, the situation seems the same hopeless for Ukrainian defenders and increasingly leaning to the Russian invaders’ side despite official Ukrainian claims of holding the front. Exclusive footage from near Mius, recorded by an Ukrainian camera team, reveals that the Ukrainian narrative of “defending the frontline near Fashchivka” can not be taken as fact-based anymore. Until now it was believed that this wording pointed at the village of Mius, which lies 5 km west of Fashchivka and was so far held by Ukrainian forces. However the geolocated footage shows that the actual frontline checkpoint of the Ukrainian army was located almost one kilometer west of Mius at the intersection of the E40 and the road, connecting (now) Russian-held Nikishyne and Chornukhyne in the north (see map below).

the Ukrainian checkpoint near Mius

The Ukrainian TV team visited the checkpoint on February 6, finding it widely destroyed but nonetheless scattered Ukrainian army forces in the area, however not fixed to the useless infrastructure of the frontline sector anymore. Instead, it rather looks like a visit by some Ukrainian units to the area, which did not (yet) “fall” to Russian forces, but which also can not be called “Ukrainian-held” anymore from every point of view. Hence, it must be assumed the the front line in the area of Mius became a rather fluid situation with Russian forces having literally – physically(!) – destroyed any possibility to defend the area (just like they did with so many areas before like Donetsk airport or Checkpoint 31 in northern Luhansk region). The below picture shows what is left of the former Ukrainian structure.

The scene appears unreal, with almost a dozen of Russian and Ukrainian army vehicle wreckage lying very close to each other all around the former Ukrainian checkpoint, not only indicating extremely short range battles but also an occasional shift in one side or the other holding the intersection. There are disabled / scrapped Russian Ural and Ukrainian Gaz-66 trucks, an Ukrainian MT-LB, a Russian BMP-2, a BTR-80 and – literally side by side – and Ukrainian army T-64BV and a Russian army T-72B1, only 3 meters apart.

wreckage around the checkpoint

The end of the video shows the TV team returning to Debaltseve with no further or new fortified front between the destroyed checkpoint and the city along the road. Though this can not be said with certainty, it seems there is no fallback level and the “defense” of the E50 between Fashchivka and Debaltseve now entirely depends on Ukrainian artillery and the plain hope that no Russian tank forces will come that way, fearing another “tank massacre” like the one near Sanzharivka several days ago, where Russian forces lost between 12 and 14 tanks and armored vehicles. This also means that after the fall of Nikishyne and the quasi-fall of the Mius fortification, Ridkodub 3 km to the south remains the only Ukrainian strong point in the area. This morning, the Ukrainian army confirmed, Russian forces have started their direct assault on the village, which is no vulnerable to attacks from the south, east and north. It should not take more than days, before the position falls as there is no change in tactics or balance of power in sight.

Chornukhyne

Chornukhyne is the closest developed area to Debaltseve. Only 3 km away from the Russian target town it becomes a prime goal to capture for Russian army forces as they hope, Ukrainian artillery and MLRS can and will not hit the town as hard as it did in open areas north of Debaltseve during the latest Russian pushes. Latest Russian footage from February 7 gives a chilling insight into the fighting, which by now has reached the towns suburbs with the Ukrainian fortified front having fallen apart during the last days. The starting point for Russian forces is surprisingly not nearby Fashchivka but the town of Zorynsk, which is located 12 km to the north east. Geolocated footage shows that Russian army forces start from near Zorynsk’s train station (map below). Also in this battle, Russian forces rely on light infantry units with BTR-80 and not heavy tanks like previously seen in Vuhlehirsk or elsewhere.

Zorynsk

Bypassing the Ukrainian front along the M04, Russian forces can next be seen in the suburbs of Chornukhyne, coming from the north. The fortified Ukrainian line of defense was breached some time ago (picture below), not without causing heavy Russian casualties as well as a destroyed T-64 and BMP-2 on the side of the road proves.

the former Ukrainian line of defense

It is hard to say how far Russian forces have advanced into Chornukhyne as most geolocatable buildings are destroyed and the footage includes many cuts. However there is some indication (including “60% certain geolocations”) that the footage might show they took the way as indicated below, leading to the marked ground possession in the town.

Tactical map of Chornukhyne

Inside the town, regular Russian army infantry can be seen fighting organized and using typical urban warfare tactics. There is – once again – no doubt that there are no or only very few “local rebels” involved in the push.

Russian troops inside the town

Conclusion

What does all this tell about the situation on the ground and the political implications? The most important inferences are:

1. The Ukrainian line of defense can in the best case be described as “fluid”. Despite this aspect is not conceded by the Ukrainian side, their held territory around Debaltseve is shrinking day after day. Former (“Minsk”) demarcation line checkpoints are in most cases already overrun by Russian forces or former Ukrainian “border” positions became virtual no-man’s-land and thus staging grounds for further Russian advances. Lost cities and villages like Vuhlehirsk, Nikishyne and Mius are new Russian strongholds from where they attack a much less fortified and hence more vulnerable new frontline – if there is any.

Russian army firing the 2B16 Nona-K in Vuhlehirsk

If the latest reports are true (by Tymchuk and the Information Resistance project), Ukrainian forces and Chornukhyne and Kalynivka are less than 5 km away from the crucial lifeline to Artemivsk and Debaltseve itself while the Ukrainian army was not able to recapture a singe point, town or village in the (almost) pocket of Debaltseve since the start of the Russian offensive in January.

2. Recent talks in Kiev and Moscow and even more the planned talks on Wednesday in Minsk are a charade and at the utmost a diversion by the Russian invasion command in Moscow. There is no indication of change in policy in the political arena or change in tactics on the ground. Tens of thousands of Russian soldiers were not sent to Ukraine to stop or even withdraw, shortly before reaching their next big target, which is the capture of Debaltseve. There also is – frankly spoken – no need for negotiations for the Russian side as their forces are advancing on the ground. The only imaginable outcome of negotiations under the current conditions which would actually lead to a stop in fighting is the voluntary surrender of Debaltseve by the Ukrainian army. But also this – after some weeks of a lull in fighting – would only lead to new offensive operations elsewhere in Donbas with then-available forces from the former Debaltseve front.

Russia has so far never accepted meaningful negotiations or adhered to any agreement reached as it comes from a position of military strength and advance on the ground. Before the tide has turned on the battlefields of Donbas, all promises by the aggressor can be regarded as empty talk. Thus, Ukraine and the west must do anything in their capacity to gain the upper hand on the ground before they can hope for real concessions by the Russian side. Referring to the German chancellor Angela Merkel, it must be emphasized that the conflict in Ukraine cannot not be solved by military means, but only by military means. An achieved balance of power on the ground is the only working precondition for meaningful talks on a stable and unchallenged demarcation line with all involved actors.

Geolocation and analysis of today’s battles inside Vuhlehirs’k

Posted on February 3, 2015 by Julian Röpcke

Most recent footage of two Russian camera teams provide unique and revealing insights into the current ground property situation and the course of the battles in Vuhlehirs’k. To understand the latest development in the battle for the town and give an (as most as possible) objective picture of it, I geolocated all available footage piece by piece, gaining insightful and partly surprising results.

Snipers at the southern gas station

The first footage is mainly located in the very south west of the city, only 100 meters from the town’s entrance sign along the M04 / E50. The camera team met the Russian troops at the N-W former Ukrainian army checkpoint. The next scene shows them approaching the M04 from the east, coming from a small street and not the main road, which would have been the fastest way. This way seems not to be safe to walk. They are crossing the M04, running and obviously afraid of snipers in the area.

Only when seeking shelter in some of the buildings nearby, they (the Russian media guys and soldiers) relax. As soon as they enter an open area with a wider sight line, they almost panic, being sure, there are Ukrainian forces in the area. Another scene shows them returning to the east of the city, starting on the other side of the read, this time with the gas station in the background. There is not much shooting audible, but the situation seems tense nonetheless. During the video, a former Ukrainian position as well as one to two dead Ukrainian troops can be seen but also seemingly disabled Russian vehicles, namely a BMP-1 and an Ural truck.

I mapped the entire ways, the footage shows with the “outbound trip” marked in read and the way back marked in orange.

Battle for the apartment block

Another Russian state TV team is filming in the geographical center of the city, being embedded with Russian troops, storming and Ukrainian army observation and sniper position in the highest residential building of the town, situated among the only agglomeration of large apartment blocks in Vuhehirs’k. The first scene is a brutal as unsurprising with a RF armed forces T-72 firing shell after shell into the eleven-story building, making sure, Ukrainian fire from the building ceases before the further advance.

Shortly after, Russian ground forces advance towards the apartment block from the north, using classic motorized infantry cover tactics, moving within the protection of a BTR-80.

After arriving between the high rise buildings, they enter the buildings searching for surviving Ukrainian troops. There is no shooting audible, so those troops might have fled or be dead by then. Finally the officer of the Russians is interviewed. I marked this picture as it was my starting point of geolocation (comparing it with a picture from the same house on Google Earth).

The final map geolocates the entire path the Russian troops took to approach and storm the apartment complex, revealing further insights into the who owns what across the city.

What does all this tell about the current situation in Vuhlehirs’k?

Mainly that the tactical situation is much more complicated than previously thought. The Ukrainian claim that they recaptured – or rather: re-infiltrated – many areas of the town after January 30 seems to be accurate and the Russian narrative of “full control” proven wrong (by their own footage). At the same time it can be once again concluded that Ukrainian troops in Vuhlehirs’k are severely outgunned, outnumbered and generally in a rather defensive position plus losing territory – once again, one might say. While Russian forces use BMP, BTR and main battle tanks inside the city limits, Ukrainian troops seem to rely on light vehicles (as can be seen in the footage) and light infantry units.

Finally the above and previously analyzed footage from earlier today allows to create a very current and much more founded map of today’s ground property situation among the involved parties. It shows that the situation is more complicated than 4 days ago when Russian forces controlled 90%-100% (also admitted by Ukrainian govt sources) and Ukrainian reinforcements have indeed entered almost all parts of the city. However, it also shows, they are under serious threat of losing it once again. Also the fact that Ukrainian troops seem to be mainly located in the center and southern part without heavy weapons or a stable resupply line contains the great threat of another encirclement by getting cut off from the main force in Debaltseve to the east and Artemovsk to the north west… The battle for the town continues.

Estimate map for 03.02.2015, based on analyzed footage

Footage-based analysis of the current developments in Vuhlehirs’k

Posted on February 3, 2015 by Julian Röpcke

Over the last four days (since my article on the Russian storm on Vuhlehirs’k), the situation around the current battle focus town of Vuhlehirs’k was hazy to say the least with Russian forces claiming, they controlled all of it and advanced further to the north and north east while the Ukrainian army said, they dealt devastating blows to the “terrorists and Russian Federation troops” in the area. Just today, the Ukrainian army’s spokesperson Lysenko talked of a “mass death” of militants, after they “came out of the settlement” as they were “covered” with artillery and missiles – inside. However, he also said, the surviving troops were “chased” back in by their commanders to hold it. Meanwhile, what he did not say (during the last 4 daily pressers) was whether Ukrainian troops managed to re-occupy certain or all areas of the town or if all “Ukrainian counterattack” is just a matter of extreme artillery and MLRS fire from outside.

Such extremely contrary statements by both sides involved made it very difficult to assess the situation from a fact-based perspective, not relying on claims, but veritable pictures from the ground. These pictures were not available since January 30 from neither side, making an objective evaluation of the situation virtually impossible. This changed today.

Evacuation of civilians

In the early morning of February 3, 2015, Russian media claimed, there was a “humanitarian ceasefire” in Vuhlehirs’k between the two involved parties, giving hundreds of civilians the opportunity to flee “to the safety of the DNR and Makeevka”. The Russian narrative was that all civilians in the town were “terrorized” by the Ukrainian shelling and willing to flee to Russian-held areas. Shortly after these statements, first footage appeared of what indeed seemed to be civilians lining up at the (geolocated) western railroad crossing of Vuhlehirs’k and being transported into Russian-held territory by trucks and busses. Shortly after another Russian news station reported with footage from the same area.

evacuation of civilians

There are two possible conclusions to be drawn from the footage concerning the situation in and around the city.

It seems generally unlikely that Ukrainian civilians would cross the frontline to get evacuated – even in case of a local ceasefire for several hours. Hence, it is more likely that civilians are willing to get evacuated by the respective side controlling the territory they live in. Therefore one conclusion would be that the Russian side indeed controls much of the town as several hundred civilians via their exit points of it. Not because they would be anymore aligned to their side, but simply because it is the safest way to leave the death zone. This would support the Russian narrative of wide control over the area.

At a second glance, something seems odd about the footage and queuing people especially as both Russian channels use exactly the same way to follow the line from its end to its start and the ready-to-go buses and Ural truck. If these people really would come from the main inhabited areas of Vuhlehirsk, they would line up from the east or south east, where two larger streets lead into the city. Instead, they seem to have come from the north, a direction where almost no residential buildings are situated, but the frontline between Russian and Ukrainian positions, thus two reasons speaking against taking that way to seek safety. The below map visualizes this setting.

the “evacuation” setting

This raises the question, if all of those refugees really come from the city and left it via the most dangerous way and from a direction where only few people live. Or if some of them were only moved their for the sake of some positive PR for the involved Russian army. Another possible reason is that such a “humanitarian gesture” could be a good pretext to regroup or hide own repositioning efforts in the area. In the footage, some 300-500 civilians can be seen lining up and several civilian busses as well as military truck are waiting to pick them up. This could mean that only a smaller part of the formerly 7000 inhabitants counting town is under control of the Russian army, however there is no conclusive evidence for that in the footage. In conclusion, the shown “evacuation” footage leaves some questions open while indeed showing, Russian forces control the western entrance of Vuhlehirs’k and there was no fighting before noon today. (parapgraph updated due to new footage and information) Also see Update at the end of the text.

Scenes from inside the city

Beside the scenes from the far west of Vuhlehirs’k Russian media footage included more pictures, giving a deeper insight into the situation. There is one video, summarizing all that footage, which will be analyzed in the following paragraph. The first scene shows a T-64BV with its turret blown off by what must have been caused by a major impact. Another destroyed truck can be seen as well in the picture. The wreckages can be geolocated some 100 meters to the N-W of the main intersection of the town.

destroyed T-72 close to the center

Two more geolocated images show the central intersection, which was already the scene of fighting on January 29.

the center of Vuhlehirs’k

From this footage, several conclusions can be drawn about who controls what in the town. At first, the Ukrainian claim that “all militants were killed and destroyed” in Vuhlheris’k can be falsified. Russian forces control at least the western and central part of the embattled city as the footage shows. Moreover, no military vehicles or defensive positions can be seen which means the actual frontline should be further to the east, leaving the center with the M04 behind the front and in Russian hands. However, it is also telling that Russian TV crews could not take any footage at the formerly held train station or the northern end of the town with its distinctive church (as shown several days ago). The below map shows what can be regarded as surely under Russian control in the city, taking into account the above stated reasons (e.g. safe to record by Russian TV, safe roads to get their plus the lack of real frontline positions).

overall situation map

Conclusions

So what can be concluded from the available footage?

1. There is still no proof that Ukrainian forces control any territory in or around Vuhlehirs’k. Due to the lack of available footage, recorded by the Ukrainian army or embedded media branches, the claim that “heavy fighting is ongoing across the city” can not be verified, however also not totally falsified. It is possible that Ukrainian units are still fighting inside the town, but such claim should be backed by at least one datable and geolocationable picture or video.

2. Russian forces hold major parts of the city. The analyzed footage shows that Russian forces still have a foothold in Vuhlehirs’k. Despite being hit hard by Ukrainian artillery and missiles, their presence in the west, center and thus surely also in the south can be verified.

3. It remains unclear, how much exactly the Russian army controls of the town. As stated above, the observed footage lacks the final proof, Russian forces control the entire regarded town, despite several indication is there, this might be the case. However, the situation at the real frontline seems to be regarded as too dangerous to film for Russian media or there are other reasons, why the Russian leadership is not willing to publish footage from the northern and eastern parts of Vuhlehirs’k.

Last but not least, two more images from the latest footage should be considered. The first shows what appears to be a unexploded BM-27 missile, stuck in the mud, just beside the destroyed T-64. It is not unreasonable to infer that the Ukrainian army is shelling the Russian-held center (and possibly other parts) of the town Vuhlerhirs’k with 220 mm calibre missiles from the type “Uragan” despite the certain possibility that civilians may still be residing inside the town. Footage of such an attack could be seen in the January 29 footage and the fact that the Ukrainian army is “covering” the Russian invaders in the town is emphasized almost daily by the Ukrainian army command.

Unexploded BM-27

The second picture is another piece of evidence that no one but the regular Russian army is leading the fight vs. Ukrainian forces across Donbas. It shows the hit wreckage of a Russian army Ural-4320 truck, still bearing the typical unit identification mark at the vehicle’s bumper. This is another reminder to European media that no “separatists” are battling the Ukrainian army, but the armed forces of the Russian Federation. Also and especially at the battlefield of Vuhlehirs’k.

Russian army Ural-4320

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Update

Pictures that appeared after this article was published indeed show, queuing civilians were likely asked to do so, facing the pick-up point from the north and the rail tracks. However it appears they originally came from the south east, so from the city itself. They were probably asked to take this “odd” 400 meter detour to keep the main road clear for other refugee cars and military vehicles passing by. This means that the chance, some of them were only “moved there” for any purpose is much less likely. – New facts bring new insights. That’s the way it is.

Route of fleeing civilians towards the buses and trucks

The Ukrainian line of defense further collapses – the fall of Nikishyne

Posted on February 1, 2015 by Julian Röpcke

The situation around the Ukrainian city of Debaltseve remains extremely difficult to assess with different sources – even of the same side – announcing totally different situation reports, especially from the embattled town of Vuhlehirsk. While the Russian side claims, it not only holds the town, but extended its controlled territory some 4 km to the north, taking the village of Kalynivka and controlling the M03, effectively closing the pocket around Debaltseve, Ukrainian sources paint a sharply different picture of the situation. Depending on the respective source, there is either still Ukrainian resistance and fighting inside Vuhlehirsk or the city was lost with Ukrainian forces remaining in control of the surrounding areas, further preventing the Debaltseve trap to finally snap shut, trapping more than 5000 Ukrainian troops.

However, what was confirmed by both sides today is the fall of Nikishyne in the far south of the Ukrainian bridgehead. Though, Nikishyne at a first glance might look like and unimportant small village in the middle of nowhere and despite the fact that Ukrainian forces only held the northern edge of it since September last year, its fall is significant.

Together with Mius and partly Chornukhyne, Nikishyne was one of the three inhabited points, where the Ukrainian army built up a thin but strong (as without an alternative) line of defense south and south east of Debaltseve. The below map shows the situation from today, already including the reported territorial losses at all three defense points over the last 24 hours (especially the loss of Nikishyne).

The defensive line was established 5 months ago and reinforced since then. There is virtually no fortified fallback level between Nikishyne and Debaltseve plus capturing one of the three strongpoints opens the flank to the respective two other ones, possibly leading to a chain reaction in military setbacks.

First Russian footage from Nikishyne showed the village from a drone above – an increasingly popular tool by Russian media to prove their claims – as well as the administrative building in the center of the settlement. And indeed, this footage made it possible to verify the location.

Nikishyne from above

Shortly after more Russian media footage was published, once again proved that regular army main battle tanks (of the type T-64BV) were involved in the storming operation.

T-64BV in Nikishyne

At the same time, more footage showed that the Ukrainian line of defense north of the village consisted of a fortified trenches system, some BMP armored vehicles and anti tank guided missiles weapons. However, different from the (most probable) fall of Vuhlherisk, 2 days ago, today Ukrainian forces were not willing to withdraw until the last moment, leading to the destruction and capture of the majority of the used equipment and several armored vehicles by the Russian side.

Destroyed and captured Ukrainian weapons

The apparent order to hold the position at any price is another indication of the importance of this outpost 12 km south east of Debaltseve which was at the same time the closest point to the important Russian-occupied cities of Thorez and Shakhtarsk, Ukraine held (until today).

While I cannot emphasize enough that all analysis made here, is based on footage and reports, rather than “hard facts” (which are simply not available at the moment) and that we are still looking at a more or less dynamic situation, I tried to create a (rough) situation map for February 1 2015 for Debaltseve and the surrounding areas, which is shown below.

situation map

How obscure the situation still is can be illustrated with fresh geolocated footage, showing “an Ukrainian army position at a mine near Vuhlehirsk burning”. The mine is right in the middle of the territory, claimed to be taken by Russian troops so far, proving there is – for sure! – still a certain degree of inaccuracy within the general view, also affecting my creted maps from intel analysis.

Ukrainian-held mine?!

While keeping circumstances and uncertainties like this in mind, the above situation map around Debaltseve can be taken as an approximate starting point to assess the current military situation in the area as of today. Once again, the main conclusion of such assessment can only be: Considering the current setting in and around the Ukrainian bridgehead while keeping up a purely defensive strategy can and will only lead to total defeat in the area. The fall of Nikishyne – a strongly fortified and fiercely defended strategical position in the overall defense of Debaltseve – might only by another piece in a larger puzzle. However, it perfectly fits the bigger picture and must be yet another reminder that there are only two possible options to continue: Withdraw and give up the entire bridgehead of Debaltseve … or change tactics and switch to most severe offensive operations between Stakhanov and Horlivka (for now), like Ukraine’s interior minister demanded it today.

The beginning of the end – Russian forces take Vuhlehirs’k

Posted on January 30, 2015 by Julian Röpcke

It comes as no surprise that yesterday around noon, strong Russian army forces started their so far heaviest assault on the 7800 souls town of Vuhlehirs’k, the second biggest town within the so-called “Debaltseve bridgehead”, a territory held by the Ukrainian army and volunteer corps between the Russian-ruled “republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk. A look at the official “ATO map” shows the strategic significance of the town, not only being the last fortress between the Russian military hub of Horlivka and Ukrainian-held Debaltseve, but also key to the only open resupply route between Debaltseve and Artemivsk, further to the west. The only road, the M03, runs just 5 km to the north east of the town and whoever controls all of Vuhlehirs’k also controls the movement between some 5000 Ukrainian troops east of it and the rest of Ukraine (map).

tactical map

Hence, it was an imperative for Russian troops to capture this town, before starting the direct attack on Debaltseve. As a matter of fact, controlling Vuhlehirs’k and the territory to its north could even avoid a direct assault on Debaltseve as a lasting siege would force thousands on Ukrainian troops to surrender without a fight, running out of food and ammunition. The general Russian strategy in the area was also described in my article from January 27, predicting “the fall of Debaltseve is inevitable […] if there is no radical change in tactics”. As there is no sign on the horizon of this change to come, regular Russian army forces began their assault from Horlivka in the west and Kayutyne in the south on January 29. While on this day, only little footage was published, showing that they overran the outer defensive line of Vuhlehirs’k, losing at least one T-72B1 and taking several Ukrainian soldiers POW, early January 30, Russian state TV published extensive video footage of the battle and its aftermath. Already on the way to Vuhlehirs’k, many Russian army T-72 main battle tanks could be seen, proving this is no further faltering skirmish, but indeed the long anticipated major push, military forces would conduct from the daily resupplied and reinforced areas north east of Donetsk city.

T-72 on the road to Vuhlehirs’k

The following footage shows the brutality of the battle that took place on the western and southern entrances of Vuhlehirs’k, where Ukrainin forces put up fierce resistance and destroyed more Russian tanks (see picture below) and likely also many troops, which are not shown on Russian footage, but were outgunned and defeated in the end, allowing the Russian army to enter the center of the town.

destroyed Russian T-64BV (no Ukr IFF)

Next scenes of the analzed footage show the very center of Vuhlehirs’k, where fighting still took place and residential buildings around the main intersection of the M04 highway were burning. Some Ukrainian troops seemed to still resist as shooting was aubilbe and Russian forces were still in a cautios and nervous mood.

Russian soldiers in the center of the city

When the situation calmed down a little bit, Russian TV teams were able to take wider shots of the area, making it possible to geolocate and thus verify the footage. This enabled a clear confirmation of the fact that – at least yesterday afternoon – Russian forces were present in the center of the city, dominating its vital route to Debaltseve itself.

Geolocation of the Russian advance

At the same time, this geolocation and taking into account the previously analyzed footage made the creation of a strategic map of the battle and ground possession status possible – again – for this time yesterday afternoon. It shows that Russian forces indeed stormed Vuhlehirs’k from Kayutyne just south of it and a long the railway to the west, so from Horlivka and its suburbs. Both (footage analysis-based) assault directions were later confirmed by Ukrainian journalists and soldiers on the ground.

Strategic map of the battle

The crucial question remains, what happened after yesterday afternoon. While the Russian propaganda claims, it caputred most of the town and the battle is effectively over, various Ukrainian sources paint totally different pictures of the situation. The commander of the well-known Ukrainian national guard force “Battalion Donbas” for example, said this morning on his facebook page that the town was lost. Shortly after, reports from journalists on the ground said, Ukrainian forces would hold the northern and eastern part of the town, starting from the train station. This version would perfectly correspond with the created map above. However in the afternoon, the Ukrainian government’s MP and interior ministry member Anton Gerashchenko claimed that entire Vuhlehirs’k was back under Ukrainian control due to “accurate artillery strikes and daring maneuvers of our tanks”. It is telling that this most official statement so far also claimed, Russian troops only managed to capture a “suburb” of the town yesterday, but were repulsed. A flagrant lie as this article has proven. But what really happened last night? Russian media footage shows intense Ukrainian multi launch rocket system attacks. On the center of Vuhlehirs’k – and on Russian troops stationed their overnight. However, what is not shown are Ukrainian tanks or ground troops re-entering the city or any fighting from the Russian side. Instead it ends with Russian tank drivers, showing the victory sign on broad daylight.

MLRS attacks on Russian forces overnight

Despite the fact that it remains unproven if the latest scene really shows the day after or the time before the Ukrainian artillery / MLRS “counterattack” during the night, it must be doubted that the Ukrainian army either has the technical and manpower-related capabilities in the area to launch a counteroffensive on hundreds – if not thousands – of well-armed Russian troops in the town, enyjoing a steady flow of resupplies from Horlivka and Yenakijeve. Therefore, my final assessment of the claim would be that we are talking about the same “repelling” successes as were claimed for 5 days over the new terminal of Donetsk airport. All turning out to be untrue.

Update —

Shortly after the article at hand was published (in the evening hours of January 30), Russian LifeNews brang a report from Vuhlehirs’k, proving that the city has entirely fallen to Russian army forces and Ukrainian counteroffensives – if there were any – totally failed. Video footage does not only show heavy tank and apc forces (T-64BV, T-72B1, BMP-2) inside the town today.

Russian tanks and apc

It also contains geolocatable footage of a church in the northern outskirts of the town, showing Russian forces pointing their rifles to the north and the LifeNews “journalist” (not!) reporting without cover from possible small arms fire. According to the LifeNews report, Ukrainian forces were pushed out of the town and are shelling it with mortars and artillery from Kalynivka in the north and Debaltseve. This seems to correspond with the footage itself.

Geolocation in northern Vuhlehirsk

From a larger distance, the geolocated footage is evidence that Russian forces took over (at least) 90% of the town including the strategic train station, which was the front line earlier this morning according to this article (read above) and Ukrainian journalist reports.

city map

Looking at the powerful involved forces (dozens of tanks, apc and hundreds to thousands of Russian troops), there seems to be no chance the Ukrainian army will recapture the area (as it did not recapture ANY Russian-taken area since September last year). Knowing that the Russian forces are as quickly as possible moving northeastwards, it becomes clear where their aim lies. The target is to cut the M03 as soon as possible, creating a pocket with more than 5000 Ukrainian troops in Debaltseve. Looking at the speed of their advance, this might become true within days rather than weeks.

regional map

End of the update —

In conclusion, I might sound once again like a broken record. I wrote 3 days ago “if there is no radical change in tactics by the Ukrainian side”, it will not only lose the “bridgehead” of Debaltseve, but entire Donbas. I continued warning that “purely defensive operations against an enemy with the fire – and man – power observed in eastern Ukraine during the last 4 weeks, leads to sustained territorial losses.” I have nothing to add to these statements beside calling upon the Ukrainian government once again: Act now or start digging trenches on the eastern outskirts of Kharkiv and Zaporizhia. Because this is where the current course of the fighting is leading sooner rather than later.

Is the fall of Debaltseve imminent? – A threat assessment.

Posted on January 27, 2015 by Julian Röpcke

On January 9, I predicted an imminent offensive in and around the Ukrainian city of Debaltseve, calling it “Operation Closing the Gap” as that last remaining Ukrainian stronghold in eastern Donetsk region does not only look like a cut into the Russian-held territory in Donbas, it also feels like one for Moscow and its puppet regimes in eastern Ukraine (see map below).

Just a couple of days later, the “much-anticipated” offensive began after Russian army troops took over the strategically important cities of Horlivka, Stakhanov and Alchevsk (1, 2), formerly held by semi-professional Russian invasion forces. Since then not only Russian media speculates about an imminent fall of the city possibly preceded by creating a pocket in which thousands of Ukrainian soldier might be caught (oftenly going by the nam “Ilovaisk 2.0 bringing into mind the encirclement of the southern Donetsk city which led to the death and capture of around 1000 Ukrainian troops).

But how big is the threat really? Is the “imminent fall” of the city just ahead?

To answer these questions, a look at the current setting on the ground is an absolute imperative. However, it appears that this setting and the military developments leading to it and continuing these days are rather a question of perspective than written in stone. So how can the qestion be answered according to the involved actors onthe ground?

Yes, if you look at the pro-Russian map of the situation and follow its creators’ (and media) reasoning. In there portrayal of the situation, the southern line of defense along the villages of Mius, Nikishyne to Bulavyns’ke has been overrun by Russian forces, the push from Zoryns’k in the north east already rached the outskirts of Debaltseve itself and the pocket in the west as almost closed with Svitlodars’k and Myronivs’kyi reached, leaving a less than 2 km broad corridor to supply Debaltseve being closed within hours or days (see map below).

pro-Russian map of the situation, Januar 25

No, if you look at the official Ukrainian army map and follow its reasoning of the current military situation. Despite multiple indicated battles and artillery shelling in this battlefield sector, there are no territorial changes – since September 2014 (!). The southern frontline extends just north of Kirovs’ke, the north-eastern one is close to Zorins’k and in the west, Svitlodars’k and Myronivs’kyi are not even close to being reached, leaving an almost 10 km wide corridor to Artemivs’k and indicating nothing like a pocket in the naking (see map below). Comparing the map to the Ukrainian one used at the beginning of the article (from early January), it even seems like the distance between Svitlodars’k and the Russian-occupied territory has almost doubled since then putting it in an even safer position.

Ukrainian map, January 27

Looking at these two assessments of the current situation by the opposing parties, it becomes obvious that both include partial exaggeration and respective whitewashing of the real situation on the ground.

So how does it really look like and what is the prospect for the next days? The answer is hard to find as there is a particular lack of footage and verifiable from this very front sector. However this alone also already reveals something about the real situation. Over the last months and especially since January 2015, Russian media representatives became more and more a propaganda mouthpiece of the advancing invasion forces – mostly Russian regular army units forwardmost by now. Hence, footage of every possible advantage, even though achieved by obvious Russian army troops, is recorded and broafcasted like in the cases of Checkpoint 31 in Luhansk and Verkhn’otorets’ke in Donetsk region. Therefore, there seems to be a quite linear connection between the apprearance of footage from the respective front and military achievements in the area in question: No footage = No advantage. As there is not Russian media footage of storming and holding Nikishyne or observing the M03 between Debaltseve and Alchevs’k so far, it can be concluded that these positions were not really taken or only in sight so far and remain under Ukrainian army control.

At the same time it is out of question that Russian troops heavily shell Ukrainian positions around Debaltseve and along its only supply line since almost two and started several tank assaults on it, without going “all in” and verifiable having lost significant numbers of T-64, T-72 or even T-80 so far. According to different reports by the “Information Resistance” analysis center and the Ukrainian government, the Russian army command has amassed some 2000 troops just north of Debaltseve (mainly Alchevsk, Stakhanov, Pervomaisk) and another 2000 to its south-west (in and around Horlivka). These troops are in possession of hundreds of artillery pieces, multi-launch rocket systems and tanks of various kinds. Also therefore, this sustained and increasingly heavy fire must take its toll on Ukrainian troops from a very basic / physical point of view and is leading to increasing casualties and loss of material along the front. Numbers are sketchy, but it can be assumed that between 10 and 20 Ukrainian troops drop out of the defense of Debaltseve per day, getting killed or injured by all kind of Russian attacks (that estimated figure – some 30% of the daily Ukrainian casualties – is generaly confirmed, but only seldomly geographically located and thus not 100% certain). These troops and their damaged / destroyed equipment must be replaced it must be questioned if the Ukrainian army is able to do so for the weeks and months to come.

The following (self-created) map shows the situation as it is most likely right now on the ground, considering Ukrainian as well as Russian reports with a grain of salt. Marked are areas held by the Ukrainian and Russian army / attackers as well as verified attack direction and shelling targets over the last 24 hours.

current situation estimate

So where does all this lead?

As the Ukrainian side is running low on resupplies in manpower and equipment and the Russian side seems to have an endless flow of new arms, professional soldiers and sacrificable fighters (among them confirmed Russian criminals from Tyumen and Rostov, being forced to fight in Ukraine to avoid their respective prison terms in Russia), there seem to be no sustainable realistic outlook of holding the Ukrainian front as it is. It remains dubious if the Russian side has already started to use its elite army forces from the 58th army of the Southern Military District, which are also confirmed to be active some 20 km north of Debaltseve. The only mention-worthy tank assault so far happened on January 25, coming from the Luhansk village of Kalynove and being stopped at the outer northern line of Ukrainian defense in Sanzharivka. If the Russian force finally decides to seriously use its main force in Luhansk, there seems no reasonable chance, the Ukrainian army will be able to hold back such assault for a very long time. This assault – in my analysis – has not started so far, but the threat of it beginning soon clearly stands in the room.

In conclusion, the fall of Debaltseve seems not imminent talking about a span of hours or days. Too many Ukrainian forces are defending a too large area to be simply encircled like it happened in Ilovaisk in late August last year. Also even if the pocket is closed in the west and the M03 is cut off near Svitlodars’k, there is a high chance that Ukraina would finally decide to go all in and attack the newly Russian-held areas to save several thousand soldiers in and around Debaltseve. This however would not change the general setting at the front and only delay the siege by some days or weeks.

At the same time, the fall of Debaltseve is inevitable intermediate-term, talking about the coming weeks and months if there is no radical change in tactics by the Ukrainian side or a – very unlikely – real ceasefire starting soon. They Ukrainian strategy of “holding the line” didn’t work around Donetsk airport, it didn’t work between Avdeevka and Horlivka and it didn’t work between Frunze and Krymske, all areas where Russian forces took control over the last 10 days only. Purely defensive operations against an enemy with the fire – and man – power observed in eastern Ukraine during the last 4 weeks, leads to sustained territorial losses with only the needed time depending on the inadequacy of forces and equipment at the respective front sector. The Russian strategy around Debaltseve is clear and openly admitted (see illustrative map below).

the Russian strategy around Debaltseve

Without giving a crushing – offensive – response interfering with these plans and thereby forcing the aggressor into meaningful negotiations on longtime mutually respected demarcation lines, the threat of the fall of Debaltseve is as high as never before. Not within days or possibly weeks; but almost certainly at some point during the first half of 2015.

Hard evidence, the regular Russian army invades Ukraine

Posted on January 23, 2015 by Julian Röpcke

Over the last 72 hours, increaring reports of regular “Russian army” deployments inside Ukraine emerged, not only from blogging insiders and investigative homepages, but also from the Ukrainian president and army command themselves (a very rare move, despite the widely dominating verbal calming down attempts). Nonetheless, footage to prove such “new” statements was lagging over the first days, a fact, understandable under the current circumstances of the Moscow regime, not willing to uncover its full-scale military invasion into Ukraine. However since yesterday, January 22, several undeniable video sequences from different front sectors across Donbas emerged, undeniably supporting the Ukrainian intelligence reports.

1. The Grad-K in Donetsk

Most bulletproof evidence is the appearance of the most modern Russian army 2B26 Grad-K system mounted on a KamAZ-5350 chassis (pictures below) just a few kilometers from Donetsk airport. This refurbished BM-21 system was revealed in 2011 and delivered to the Russian armed forces from 2012. It is ONLY operated by the Russian army itself and there is no other source of such weapon system available.

The Grad-K in Donetsk

Further details are striking. The systems appears in Donetsk in fresh winter camouflage showing it was prepared for winter war and surely sent in under the current weather conditions. Also the “rebel” camera man pulls down his camera as soon as it leaves the line of 4 older BM-21, mounted on Ural-375D (a system, delivered in its hundreds by the Russian army to its proxies and forces in Donbas). He obviously has the orders to not film such system in that area and that time. However, he lifts it up 4 seconds too early clearing the sight of this 100% Russian army weapon system.

2. The BM-30 Smerch in Makeevka

In the evening of January 22, footage of a BM-30 MLRS system appeared, claimed to be taken in Makeevka, just a few kilometers east of Donetsk and less than 20 km to the nearest frontline. The BM-30 “Smerch” (also known as 9A52-2 Smerch-M) is the heaviest multi launch rocket system (MLRS) in its “family”, exceeding the smaller BM-21 and BM-27 in its caliber (300mm) and range (up to 90 km). Independent geolocations of the footage by several expertes (e.g. Dajey Petros and me) confirmed the the location exactly where it was reported to be, so (very) close to the frontline for a system with such operational range.

The BM-300 in Makeevka

The system has never before been recorded in Russian-held territory for a simple reason: It was not there. While the Ukrainian army lost several weapon systems during the created boilers in August and September last year to Russian invaders, the BM-30 was always able to stay far behind the front due to its range and was never captured by “rebel” forces or the vast majority of Russian mercenaries and Russian army forces. Knowing that there is no credible narrative for the appearance of such heavy and exclusive system “in separatist hands”, the Russian invasion command abstained from sending the system to Ukraine over the following 4 “ceasefire” months, despite deploying thousands of other military vehicles like tanks, apc and smaller MLRS. However now that it goes “all in” and started an offensive to take entire Luhansk and Donetsk regions (and even more), the Russian army command decided to not spare this long range, deadly tool of warfare anymore, no matter the fact that this is another 100% evidence, it is fighting in neighboring Ukraine.

3. More proof

There is much more (very) recent evidence that Ukrainian intelligence and all “real” / evidence-based experts are right, calling the latest developments a flagrant and open Russian aggression against its western neighbour. Just like the pictures of Russian Far East soldiers with green ribbon after taking Checkpoint 31 in northern Luhansk region, the secret recording of a 500+ troops Russian Army convoy, approaching the town of Stakhanov or footage of a military makeshift bridge, built by Russian sappers over a river in Luhansk with the help of a MT-55A AVLB. …

But all these “smoking guns” might be disputed and denied as “so or differently explainable”, despite all indication leading into the same (Eastern) direction. Meanwhile the two above mentioned cases, recorded over the last 24 hours, provide sufficient evidence, regular Russian army troops are not just “located all around Donbas, ready to move in” – like acknowledged by many western media and security sources – but fighting on all front sectors inside Ukraine, reinforcing and replacing its pre-existing invasion forces.

PS.

This article only lists NEW evidence that appeared over the last 24 hours and after the statement of Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko in Davos. Of course, multiple Russian-army-only equipment appearances over the last 7 months (T-72B3, T-72B1, BPM-97, GAZ-3937, BTR-82A etc.) leave no doubt that it was and is the Russian army that exclusively supplies all anti-Ukrainian forces in the Donbas with weapons and exerts its surpreme command over them.

The fall of Donetsk airport – shedding light on the latest developments

Posted on January 21, 2015 by Julian Röpcke

After 3 days of complete media blackout from Donetsk airport and one day after Russian invasion forces proved to have captured several Ukrainian troops at the airport, fresh footage from inside the new terminal appeared.This footage leaves no doubt that not only the entire terminal and facility building complex (with the possible exception of the collapsed tower and radar station) are in Russian hands, but also that Russian media and troops can move freely over the apron north of the terminal between the five gates of the former airport, leaving no doubt of not being afraid by any opposing forces close-by.

Geolocation of Russian media footage from January 21

the situation on January 18

Why can this be said with almost 100% certainty? The last article, dealing with the airport, was written on January 19 and reflected the “who controls what” situation from one day earlier, namely January 18. Looking at the analysis of the different possessions within the building from that day, it becomes clear that only parts of the western and north western front were still held by Ukrainian forces, while most of the terminal was already under Russian control already – proven by lots of footage over the previous days. Latest available footage from Cyborgs within the building ( “playing soccer”) could be located between the very left and second from left gates. This area is entirely under Russian control now, leaving no doubt that there are no Ukrainian soldiers left in the terminal.

Other footage, showing a panorama of the northern gates section of the terminal, adds to the impression that this is no “sneaked” – or even “faked” footage, but reflects the real situation in the area. It was recorded between gate 2 and 3 (from the left) and shows both the destroyed gates with the foggy horizon to the north and two destroyed Ukrainian T-64 plus several more army vehicles, lost due to the extreme shelling and overwhelming ground troop attacks, never short of “human resources” to throw (and sacrifice) into the battle.

Gate 3

destroyed T-64

It is not totally clear, when the terminal fell completely to Russian troops but the story around the captured Ukrainian troops from yesterday morning seems to give at least some indication. According to the Ukrainian army they were sent to evacuate wounded fellow troops and resupply them with ammunition. However the claim that an incompetent commander “missed the terminal by 800 meters during fog” sounds not very reliable, giving the fact that he only had to follow the taxi ways from Pisky. Instead – sadly – the version some of the captured Ukrainian troops said in Russian confinement sounds slightly more reliable, despite it has to be taken with a pinch of salt. That version claiming to not knowing the situation at the airport plus the claim of Russian invaders that those troops “just ran into us” indicates the formerly described “safe movement zone” (map further above) ceased to exist between January 19 and January 20, despite heaviest artillery, MLRS and tank fire on all Russian positions by the Ukrainian defenders N and N-W of the airport.

But as so often in war, the truth is somewhere in the middle. On January 20, Russian media showed 5 Ukrainian POW and claimed to have killed 6 more, which surely does not mean that this was the force to recapture – or only attack – the airport. The next morning, Russian channels aired footage of captured Ukrainian troops in Donetsk hospitals, suddenly saying, 16 of them are treated for their injuries at the moment. This is speculation of course, but it appears that those “new” captured – dusty and injured – troops might have been the remaining Cyborgs, Ukr troops were to evacuate of reinforce the day before. As no help came, they might have decided to do the only reasonable in the light of the military superiority of the enemy. – Almost all alternatives are much worse. Russian propaganda footage also showed a number of bodies at the taken over terminal, claimed to be Ukrainian troops but without showing proof for that claim …

Whatever really happened, it looks like the last relevant Ukrainian position within the perimeters of Donetsk airport fell between January 19 and January 20 with reinforcements (/suppliers) as well as more troops from inside the terminal going into Russian POW-ship. This means that all Ukrainian claims since then that they are “still in the buildings and the airport” like states in the evening of January 21 are rather propaganda to keep up the moral than fact-based reports. The only position that remains unknown is the one of the airport’s destroyed tower, but not possibly under fire from 270 degrees, it would make little sense to hold that ruin.

Ukrainian forces are not defending, but attacking the airport now, lagging the manpower and general strength to halt or even repulse the Moscow-sent masses with their almost endless stream of mostly crude but deadly weapon systems and ammunition.

The final map shows the situation around Donetsk airport as it might look now according to this assessment. As it is still very fluid – meaning Russian troops could have captured even more right now, especially around Pisky – it reflects the actual state of affairs as it was available in the evening hours of January 21.

Map based on assessment – 21.1.2015

This article is not about putting blame on anyone for the current military development. Only so much be said: The way, the Ukrainian government and army is leading the war at the moment – it is losing it and with it large parts of Ukraine itself.

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